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ABSTRACT  
The Internet of Things (IoT) represents the seamless merging of the real and digital world, with new 
devices created that store and pass around data. Processing large quantities of IoT data will 
proportionately increase workloads of data centres, leaving providers facing new security, capacity and 
analytics challenges. Handling this data conveniently is a critical challenge, as the overall application 
performance is highly dependent on the properties of the data management service. This paper explores 
the challenges posed by cybercrime investigations and digital forensics concerning the shifting landscape 
of crime – the IoT and the evident investigative complexity – moving to the Internet of Anything 
(IoA)/Internet of Everything (IoE) era. IoT forensics requires a multi-faceted approach where evidence 
may be collected from a variety of sources such as sensor devices, communication devices, fridges, cars 
and drones, to smart swarms and intelligent buildings. 
Keywords: Computer Forensics, Mobile Forensics, Internet of Things, IoT, Internet of Anything, Internet 
of Everything, Forensic Analysis, Cybercrime Investigations, Digital Forensics. 
INTRODUCTION  
Crime has always been a part of human society, but the means by which these crimes are committed are 
constantly developing and expanding. The evolving nature of technology supports criminals with new 
methods and tools to commit crimes. Previously, criminal investigations generally relied on the analysis 
of physical evidence, the study of the crime scene, speaking to and taking statements from witnesses, and 
interviews with suspects. Today, the criminal investigator must recognise that the evidence they have to 
analyse could be in an electronic or digital form (Macdermott, Baker, & Shi, 2018). The crime scene may 
comprise a computer system, smart and small-scale digital devices or network traffic/logs as opposed to 
the traditional ‘physical’ scene. The ‘witnesses’ in these cases may be computer-generated log files, 
metadata, or browsing history. You can prove with forensic science that someone was holding a certain 
weapon via DNA/fingerprints, but how do we prove that a particular suspect was the one at the keyboard 
at the time the crime was committed? Forensic linguistics is increasingly used within this domain to 
facilitate investigations by identifying actors within an exchange, determine motive and behaviours, and 
establish a timeline of events. 
 
Technological developments and our increased interconnection to the Internet, and devices in our 
everyday lives, lead to the increase in cybercrimes. These developments and the anonymity that comes 
from the Internet serve as incentive for criminals, and thus lead to an increase in crimes involving 
computers and cybernetics. Cybercrime is a broadly defined term, which means "criminal activities 
carried out by computers or the Internet” (McMurdie, 2016) and consists of three main components: 
 The computer used as a tool for committing the crime; 
 The computer is a repository for information used or generated in the commission of a crime; 
 Information residing on the computer is the target of the crime, with the intention of damaging its 
integrity, confidentiality or availability. 
The anonymity of the Internet can create a feeling of distance, so often criminals feel removed from their 
crimes or have a feeling of dissociative ignorance to the effects their actions have on others. There were 
approximately 3.6 million cases of fraud and two million computer misuse offences in 2017, according to 
an official survey by The Office for National Statistics (Casciani, 2017). Cybercrime is increasingly 
affecting a variety of domains: government systems, large organisations, small-to-medium enterprises 
(SMEs), ecommerce, online banking, and critical infrastructure. Motivations differ, but cybercrime for 
gain is significant, much more significant than the perception of non-economic attacks, but much less in 
terms of volume of attempts or reported cases. The key concerns include damage to reputation, monetary 
loss, and effects to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data.  
 
With this evident increase in cybercrime, a significant challenge from an investigative standpoint is the 
mass of devices that can be utilised for committing the crime, and the amount of “devices of interest” to 
be identified, collected, and analysed at a crime scene. These devices vary in technological complexity 
and storage capabilities, and range from smart phones to smart watches, smart toys, gaming consoles 
(Xbox One, Sony PlayStation - PS3 and PS4), health wearables and drones. The increasing utilisation of 
cloud services in their day-to-day operations by organisations, utilisation of huge storage devices (e.g., 
Redundant Array of Interdependent Disk (RAID)) and the heightened emergence of smart device 
utilisation means that digital forensic investigations involving such systems would involve more complex 
digital evidence acquisition and analysis (Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty, & Hegarty, 2010). While developing 
standards to deal with electronic or digital evidence, it is necessary that other supporting disciplines must 
also evolve to assist the investigator in this new realm and ensure they are knowledgeable on suitable 
conduct at the crime scene.  
 
As we look ahead to a world of expanding ubiquitous computing, the interconnection of ‘Things’ to an 
‘Internet of Things’, the challenge of forensic processes such as data acquisition (both logical and 
physical) and extraction and analysis of data grows in this space. The main purpose of this article is to 
explore the key contributors to this paradigm shift and illustrate how cybercrime investigations and digital 
forensics are adjusting to this new wave of cybercrime. Objectives for exploring this technological 
advancement begin by illustrating the progression of digital forensics – from the infant computer 
forensics, to mobile forensics, to network/Cloud forensics – and how the focus is now shifting to IoT 
forensics, and inevitably IoA/IoE forensics. Imperative to this is the identification of the range of devices 
now involved in digital forensic investigations, making forensic processes more challenging and 
problematic. Future directions within the field of digital forensics and considerations are presented. The 
rest of the paper is organised as follows: the next section provides background on digital forensics and 
cybercrime investigation and the IoT paradigm is adding to the complexity, followed by digital forensics 
methodologies and procedures for various evidences, then potential challenges and considerations with 
concluding remarks and future directions.   
 
BACKGROUND 
The term ‘digital forensics’ was originally used as a synonym for computer forensics but has expanded to 
include an investigation of all devices capable of storing, processing and transmitting digital data. With 
roots in the personal computing revolution of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the discipline evolved in a 
disorganised manner during the 1990s, and it was not until the early 21st century when its prominence was 
realised (Hausknecht & Gruičić, 2017). Despite the field’s quick evolution, advancement in digital 
forensics is now more difficult to achieve. Its evolution is challenged heavily by the increasing popularity 
of digital devices and the heterogeneity of the hardware and software platforms used. For example, the 
plethora of file formats and operating systems (OSs) impede the creation of unified or standard tools, and 
the advent of smartphones that extensively use cryptography or embed digital rights management/trusted 
computing frameworks make collecting evidence a complex task (Caviglione, Wendzel, & Mazurczyk, 
2017). 
 
At a cybercrime investigation, digital forensic analysts scrutinise seized data and explain the current state 
of the digital artefact(s). Cybercrime investigations follow the standard digital forensic process and the 
investigations are performed on static data, in the form of digital images that have been taken using 
specialist software, such as FTK Imager or EnCase Forensic Imager. Typical forensic analysis includes a 
manual review of the material on the media and filtering files of suspicion. Reviewing the registry for 
suspicious information is an additional action, as is using keyword searches for evidence related to the 
offence in the hope that files of suspicion are found – which is a lengthy and time-consuming process. 
Digital forensics deals with the acquisition, preservation, examination, analysis and presentation of 
electronic evidence. Networked computing, wireless communications and portable electronic devices 
have expanded the role of digital forensics beyond traditional computer crime investigations. Practically 
every type of crime now involves some aspect of digital evidence; digital forensics provides the 
techniques and tools to articulate this evidence in legal proceedings. It has a vital role in information 
assurance – investigations of security breaches yield valuable information that can be used to design more 
secure and resilient systems (Liu, Singhal, & Wijesekera, 2017). 
 
Network forensics techniques assist in tracking internal and external network attacks by focusing on the 
devices present and the communication mechanisms applied. Many network attacks are designed to block 
users from accessing services and providers from delivering services, i.e., Denial of Service (DoS) or 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Critical security issues include data integrity, user confidentiality, 
data and service availability, and trust among entities. Securing applications and services provided in the 
Cloud against cyber-attacks is hard to achieve due to the complexity, heterogeneity, and dynamic nature 
of such systems (Macdermott, Shi, & Kifayat, 2017). Network forensics involves identifying, capturing, 
discovering, and analysing network devices as well as infrastructure (Khan, Gani, Wahab, Shiraz, & 
Ahmad, 2016). The purpose of such an analysis is to explore digital evidence in the network traffic after 
the occurrence of a suspicious event. In a larger scale environment, it is the ability to sift through 
gigabytes of the captured network traffic and construct multiple views of that traffic benefits network 
security, policy enforcement, and network maintenance personnel (Corey, Peterman, Shearin, Greenberg, 
& Van Bokkelen, 2002). Cloud forensics is an emerging branch of network forensics, which involves 
post-incident analysis of systems with distributed processing, multi-tenancy, virtualisation and mobility of 
computations (Liu et al., 2017). In the virtual environments provided in a cloud computing system, digital 
forensic investigations can be troublesome due to its dynamic nature. If a software application is accessed 
via a cloud computing system, data is traditionally written to the OS. Evidence can be acquired in the 
form of registry entries or temporary Internet files, which would reside or be stored within the virtual 
environment and so get lost when the user exits the cloud. 
 
Digital forensics is becoming more challenging due to the tremendous increase in computing devices and 
computer-enabled paradigm, providing new challenges to the distributed processing of digital data and 
adding to the investigative complexity. The IoT foresees the Internet as a set of intelligent, self-
conﬁguring, and interconnected objects in a dynamic and global infrastructure. These ‘Things’ or 
‘Objects’ refer to uniquely addressable smart devices that are generally distributed endowed with sensing 
and actuation capabilities and equipped with limited computing resources such as CPU, memory, and 
network capabilities. This is evidently an integration of several technologies and communication solutions 
such as Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) technology, sensors and actuators (Baker, Asim, Tawfik, 
Aldawsari, & Buyya, 2017). To effectively deal with this fundamental change in evidence, the science of 
digital forensics is developing. The objective is still the same as in physical crime scenes; determining the 
crime, identifying and analysing the evidence, and establishing the party or parties involved. While 
developing standards for dealing with electronic or digital evidence, it is necessary that other supporting 
disciplines must also evolve to assist the investigator (Rogers, 2003). As of now, there is a standardised 
method for retrieving evidence from traditional devices such as hard drives and mobile phones but no 
clear procedures for IoT-based investigations, which we believe will require a multi-faceted approach. 
There are no defined principles for IoT forensics as the sphere of “devices of interest/potential evidence” 
continues to grow, as such; investigations will significantly rely on the mechanical and physical nature of 
the smart device, since evidence fingerprinting is a major challenge. Evidence can be collected from fixed 
sensors in homes and buildings, moving sensors built into cars and wearable devices, communication 
devices, cloud storage and even ISP logs. 
 
CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATIONS AND DIGITAL FORENSICS 
Digital forensics has become an important tool in the fight against cybercrime via identification of 
computer-based and computer-assisted crime. Today’s huge volumes of data, heterogeneous information 
and communication technologies, and borderless cyber infrastructures create new challenges for security 
experts and law enforcement agencies investigating cybercrimes. Pursuing cybercrime investigations can 
span international borders, jurisdictions, and legal systems. This issue, jointly with the huge volume and 
richness of information, highly heterogeneous ICT technologies, and complex modern hardware/software 
frameworks, raises new challenges, especially in digital forensics (Caviglione et al., 2017). Digital 
forensic investigations are ubiquitously utilised within law enforcement to investigate electronic media 
and increasingly within organisations as part of their incident response procedures (Al Fahdi, Clarke, & 
Furnell, 2013). Historically, the impact of e-crime or computer related crime has involved only a small 
proportion of victims and investigators. However, this position is changing and the impact of digital 
evidence within ‘conventional’ investigations is already widespread. Any investigation within the public 
or private arena is likely to involve the seizure, preservation and examination of electronic evidence, 
therefore digital evidence processing must form an integral part of the wider investigative process.  
 
A ‘digital forensics process model’ or ‘digital forensic methodology’ provides a framework for 
procedures and processes that should be followed when engaging in a digital forensics-based 
investigation. An increasing number of models have been proposed, attempting to speed up the 
investigative process or to solve problems encountered during the forensic investigation (Du, X., Le-
Khac, N. A., & Scanlon, 2017). Mocas identified the following standards for digital evidence: Duplication 
integrity, Authentication, Reproducibility, Non-interference, Identifiable non-interference, and 
Minimisation. These properties and terms establish principles for research and tools development (Mocas, 
2004). For crime scene processing and evidence confiscation, the use of model or methodology is 
dependent upon the investigator. There are many models to choose from, each comprising the same main 
stages (identify, secure, analyse, present), but with differing attention focusing on different stages. For 
example, the “Advanced Data Acquisition Model” (ADAM) methodology (Adams, 2013) allocates 
considerable time for pre-planning and pre-investigative stages. The aim of the ADAM is to address the 
shortcomings identified in a previous review study (Adams, 2012),  revealing that none of the currently 
available models meet the needs of practitioners and researchers.  
 
Current models are criticised from different aspects, such as being too specific (Reith, M., Carr, C., & 
Gunsch, 2002), too broad (Rogers, 2006), or too complex (Selamat, S. R., Yusof, R., & Sahib, 2008). In 
contrast, “CFSAP” (Computer Forensics – Secure, Analyse, Present) comprises the four key elements of 
computer forensics (identification, preservation, analysis, and presentation) into three steps to follow: 
Secure (identify sources of digital evidence, preserve digital evidence), Analyse (forensic analysis of 
digital evidence: extract, process, interpret), Present (Presentation of digital evidence, expert opinion and 
testimony) (Macdermott et al., 2018). “Framework for Reliable Experimental Design” (FRED) proposed 
by Horsman, focuses on the underpinning procedures involved within undertaking the reverse engineering 
of digital data structures and the process of extracting and interpreting digital content in a reliable way. 
The proposed framework is designed to be a resource for those operating within the digital forensic field, 
both in industry and academia, to support and develop research best practice within the discipline 
(Horsman, 2018).  Regardless of approach, the three key stages are the collection, analysis, and 
presentation of evidence, but the level of emphasis and attention on other stages can differ. Depending on 
the scenario, there could be a need to pay more attention to other stages or to adapt the approach. There is 
a need for standardisation and transparency in digital forensic research methodologies to allow sufﬁcient 
peer-review of practices, secondary interpretation of data and the ability to assess the reliability of 
findings that are offered in any contribution to knowledge (Horsman, 2018). Following a general process 
model is not specific enough to deal with the different types of cybercrime and the broad range of cases 
encountered by law enforcement.  
 
The ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) guide (ACPO, 2012) underpins the current actions 
undertaken by investigators, regardless of forensics methodology followed within the United Kingdom. 
The ACPO guide details instructions for the investigator to legally obtain and analyse the evidence, but as 
the evidence can come in many forms and there are many scenarios, which this evidence may be involved 
in, there needs to be an effective framework to support this. With this reasoning, the investigator at the 
crime scene must follow the guidelines set by ACPO ensuring analysis of the data occurs, collecting all 
relevant data in an efficient and resourceful manner. The ACPO guide lists principles for computer-based 
electronic evidence and is listed below (ACPO, 2012): 
 Principal 1: “No action taken by law enforcement agencies or their agents should change data 
held on a computer or storage media which may subsequently be relied upon in court.”   
 Principal 2: “In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original data held on a 
computer or on storage media, that person must be competent to do so and be able to give 
evidence explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions.”   
 Principle 3: “An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer-based electronic 
evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third party should be able to examine 
those processes and achieve the same result.” 
 Principle 4: “The person in charge of the investigation (the case officer) has overall responsibility 
for ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered to.” 
These principles, if followed, allow the investigator to lawfully obtain and analyse the evidence, and 
maintain a good chain of custody. Much of the last decade’s progress concerning the shifting landscape of 
crime is quickly becoming irrelevant according to Garfinkel (Garfinkel, 2010) presenting “Digital 
Forensics Research: The Next 10 Years” at the Digital Forensics Research Conference in 2010.  Garfinkel 
argues, “We have been in a “Golden Age of Digital Forensics,” and that the Golden Age is quickly 
coming to an end. Increasingly organisations encounter data that cannot be analysed with today’s tools 
because of format incompatibility, encryption, or simply a lack of training.” The main issues identified by 
Garfinkel are concerned with the growing size of devices of interest, the size of storage devices (meaning 
longer time spent creating a forensic image), and the proliferation of OSs and file formats, which is 
increasing the requirements and complexity of forensic analysis tools and procedures. In the infancy of 
computer forensics, cases were limited to the analysis of a single device; increasingly cases require the 
analysis of multiple devices followed by the correlation of the collected evidence. Issues identified within 
the study are still prominent now in 2018 (Horsman, 2018), and the rapid embrace of the IoT/IoA era 
enhances these concerns (Macdermott et al., 2018). 
 IoT-based forensic investigations need to identify, preserve, analyse, and present the digital evidence 
collected from the IoT components. The changing landscape requires well-defined accredited tools, 
adaptive frameworks, and dynamic solutions tailored to the IoT/IoA paradigm. When an IoT device is 
identified, there is no documented method or a reliable tool to collect residual evidences from the device 
in a forensically sound manner. In addition, there are very limited methods to create a forensic image of a 
given IoT device ignoring ethical considerations when collecting evidences from devices running in a 
multi-tenancy environment. There can be masses of data to analyse, as the amount of digital media, 
storage masses can range from individual to individual, and the analysis and scrutiny of these can be 
extremely time consuming, especially when there is no clear objective in the case initially. The rapid 
implementation of connectivity in industrial control processes in critical systems, across a wide range of 
industries such as energy, mining, agriculture and aviation, has created the “Industrial Internet of Things” 
– IIoT. This is simultaneously opening up the possibility of new devices and processes, which were never 
vulnerable to such interference in the past, being hacked and tampered with, with potentially disastrous 
consequences (Hammond, 2016). 
Table 1. Forensic evidence per digital forensics ‘category’  
 Forensic evidence 
Computer The identification, preservation, collection, analysis and reporting on evidence found on computers, 
laptops, and removable storage media.  
Mobile The recovery of evidence from mobile phones, smartphones, SIM cards, PDAs, GPS devices, 
tablets, smart toys, wearables, drones and game consoles. 
Network The monitoring, capture, storing and analysis of network activities or events in order to discover the 
source of security attacks, intrusions or other problem incidents. Mechanisms include traceback, 
logging, packet marking, reference heuristic base, packet analysis (dependent upon network 
monitoring setup). 
Cloud Evidence can be distributed across several machines, most of which would be outside the control of 
the investigator, e.g., social network logs, ISPs, data in transit, online storage media, data stored by 
mobile network providers. Other challenges include the dependence of forensically-valuable data on 
the cloud deployment model, large volumes of data, proprietary data formats, multiple isolated 
virtual machine instances running on a single physical machine and inadequate tools for conducting 
cloud forensics (Liu et al., 2017). Everything online means potential evidence too is stored in the 
cloud and not just locally on the device: 
• Usage logs from smart homes. 
• Connection logs from smart buildings. 
• GPS data from smart cars/traffic sensors/utility devices. 
IoT The recovery of evidence from devices locally (depending upon IoT device) but this could also 
encompass mobile/network/Cloud forensics. Examples include fixed sensors in homes and 
buildings, moving sensors built into cars, wearable devices, communication devices, cloud storage, 
ISP logs, drone data, wearable technology. 
 
Table 1 presents forensic evidence per digital forensics ‘category’ – Computer-based, Mobile-based, 
Network-based, Cloud-based and IoT-based.  Compared to traditional digital forensics, there is less 
certainty in where data originated from, and where it is stored, so data persistence may be a problem 
(Lillis, Becker, O’Sullivan, & Scanlon, 2016). Evidence extraction and analysis is also an issue with IoT 
devices. In IoT scenarios, persistent recording is not easily achieved due to resource constraints in 
embedded systems, or smart objects with limited memory and computing. IoT devices differ not only in 
their type but also in accessibility and interfaces, vendor-specific features, and data storage (local versus 
cloud-based and persistent versus volatile) (Caviglione et al., 2017). Future digital forensics tools and 
techniques should be engineered to support heterogeneous investigations, preserve privacy, and offer 
scalability. New tools are necessary to improve IoT forensics, especially because anti-forensic techniques 
will continue to become increasingly sophisticated (Caviglione et al., 2017). Currently digital forensic and 
cyber security experts are exploring the IoT from the perspective of a digital forensic analyst concerning 
evidence handling, evidence extraction, and analysis of the collected data. Many questions have yet to be 
answered in this emerging area. Using innovative technologies, alongside the knowledge acquired from 
these studies as a starting point for understanding the IoT world and IoT-ware will help in answering 
these questions and guiding the industry with more knowledge on IoT forensics. With the new types of 
devices that are part of the IoT, we must determine the best approach for ensuring they are examined in 
the same forensically sound manner. Evidence prioritisation via advancing crime scene methodologies 
and process models is essential. 
 
CASE STUDY: CRIME SCENE CONSIDERATIONS AND CHALLENGES 
Digital forensics investigations undertaken by high-tech crime units or law enforcement can involve 
analysts with varying skillsets. While there are new and emerging technologies increasingly being used to 
commit crime, there could be miscommunication on the handling of these devices, which could affect 
ongoing cases and use of seized evidence in court. Additionally, search and seizure procedures used in the 
conventional computer forensic process are usually not applicable due to evidence being stored in cloud 
datacenters. As the digital revolution advances, consumer attitudes, beliefs and intentions have continued 
to evolve – more consumers are turning their homes into ‘smart’ homes or introducing IoT-enabled 
devices into their home. As such, within an IoT-based crime scene, there are a range of devices that could 
be located on site. Examples of potential IoT-based evidence include smart home assistants, e.g. Amazon 
Alexa (it could contain correspondence between smart assistants at other homes, or recent voice 
commands), home appliances, heating control, lighting, smart energy meters, smart plugs, doorbells, 
security, to name a few. Regardless of the circumstance of the investigation, there could be data residing 
on one or more of these devices that is vital to a case, be it, corroborating an alibi, or determining the 
device was used for something illegal or malicious. Additionally, compatibility and interoperability 
between devices is not as readily available as it seems, so many of these devices are controlled via mobile 
app, or through the smart home assistant. They may also be connected to different networks within the 
same location, or connected to another location nearby. Prior to attending a crime scene, if details are 
missing from the terms of the warrant, vital pieces of evidence may be missed. 
 
The main IoT/IoA challenge from a digital forensic perspective is that of data imaging and acquisition – 
knowing exactly where the data is and actually acquiring the data (Macdermott et al., 2018). It is also 
difficult to maintain a clear chain of custody relating to the acquisition of the evidence. Essentially, 
IoT/IoA means that investigators are unable to conform to the ACPO guide, as it is difficult if not 
impossible to satisfy all ACPO principles (if the investigation is based within the UK). Almost every 
digital forensic investigation model should start with authorisation, planning and obtaining a warrant as 
this is fundamental and can be assumed as a proper standard operating procedure, leading into a strategy 
to navigate the digital forensic investigation further (Oriwoh, Jazani, Epiphaniou, & Sant, 2013). 
 
Cybercrime investigators are often overwhelmed with the mass of digital evidence, so identification of 
items of forensic interest can be time consuming. As the digital age continues to produce an ever-
increasing variety of digital evidence – from drones, USB drives, CCTV footage, Micro SD cards, 
Xboxes, hard drives, to the broad array of mobile phones, can cause substantial case backlogs due to the 
individual scrutiny of device (Dolliver, Collins, & Sams, 2017). From a police perspective, this can slow 
down the progression of the case to the court of law where the digital evidence may be pinnacle to the 
case. Data integrity checking, which is the core of digital forensic process is another challenge, which is 
lacking uniformity due to different data imaging and acquisition approaches employed by different 
stakeholders at different locations performed with heterogeneous tools. Cross integrity checking and 
verifiability of imaged evidence in a situation where different stakeholders such as ISP, cloud service 
provider, law enforcement, digital forensics company are jointly working on the same forensic case will 
remain an open question for investigators. We believe blockchain technology could be an efficient and 
accurate way to maintain integrity of evidence and have a clear chain of command in a collaborative 
investigation, but the applications will be considered in future investigations. 
 
Encryption and cloud computing both threaten forensic visibility and both in much the same way. Cloud 
forensics also faces many challenges associated with traditional digital forensics. Encryption and other 
anti-forensic techniques are commonly used in cloud-based crimes. The limited time for which 
forensically important data is available is also an issue with cloud-based systems. Because said systems 
are continuously running data, can be overwritten at any time. Time of acquisition has also proved to be a 
challenging task concerning cloud forensics (Lillis et al., 2016). Tracing the origin of malicious activities 
or devices within an IoT environment can be challenging without monitoring architecture with forensic 
logging capabilities. The key to improving research is the development and adoption of standards for case 
data, higher-level data abstractions, and implementable models for forensic processing (Garfinkel, 2010).   
 
Blurry network boundaries and/or edgeless networks are an issue for IoT/IoA investigations i.e., without 
perimeter, or less clearly defined perimeters. The location of evidence effects ease of access, possible 
connection to other devices, local or cloud-based, etc.  All available information on an IoT device can be 
recorded locally or in the cloud. Local storage is usually limited; thus, the number of recorded sensor 
values/actuator states is kept under a certain threshold and older data might not be accessible (Caviglione 
et al., 2017). Additionally, time synchronisation too is a key issue here. With multiple sources, they may 
present different time zone references, timestamp interpretations, clock skew/drift issues, and the syntax 
aspects involved in generating a unified timeline (Lillis et al., 2016). Legal and jurisdiction issues are 
commonplace; given the fact that some investigations encompass an international scope, e.g., data 
residing under multiple jurisdictions, laws and regulations must evolve to enable a global standard for 
digital forensics (Sachowski, 2016). The multi-jurisdictional, multi-environmental nature of cases results 
in different applications of digital forensic principles being seen by courts in different ways; therefore the 
methodology employed by digital forensic practitioners will always come under scrutiny (Adams, 2012).  
 
Oriwoh et al. (Oriwoh et al., 2013) state any digital forensics solution that fails to consider the nature of 
the IoT to continually grow, adapt and mutate may eventually become too structured to be of any use. 
With an IoT-based environment, the networks bleed into each other with Body Area Networks (BAN) 
moving between Wide Area Networks (WAN) as people travel from, for instance, their homes to their 
places of work. One ramification for digital forensic investigators will be how to handle developing 
efficient methods of collecting all the relevant evidence from an object of forensic interest that has 
travelled between multiple networks, leaving multiple digital fingerprints in its wake. This is because in 
the IoT domain the boundaries between BAN, Personal Area Networks/Perimeter Area Networks/Premise 
Area Networks (PAN), Home Area Networks (HAN) or Hospital Area Networks (HAN), Local Area 
Networks (LAN), Neighbourhood Area Networks (NAN), Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN) and 
WAN will disappear and these networks will bleed into each other as users roam from one into another.  
 
Figure 1 (Oriwoh et al., 2013) shows the movement of IoT-ware between inter-connected networks 
introduces challenges for digital forensics. IoT-based forensic solutions would have to recognise IoT-
based devices as they approach and join networks, and recognise when they leave. Movement of things 
from one network to another can have implications for forensics because of the challenge of obtaining 
permission at the perimeters of these disparate networks as well as within the networks (Oriwoh et al., 
2013).  
 
 Figure 1. Movement of IoT-ware between inter-connected networks (Oriwoh, Jazani, Epiphaniou, & Sant, 
2013) 
 
Digital forensics will have to be able to investigate IoT components, which can range from nodes 
deployed in small scenarios (such as smart objects and smart watches) to those deployed in large ones 
(such as smart cities) – including analysis of attacks on IoT devices, and the digital forensics–aided 
investigations of physical-world crimes (Caviglione et al., 2017). Cloud forensics will also play a role in 
reinforcing cybersecurity best practices, since all data generated by IoT components will be stored on a 
cloud due to its scalability, capacity and convenience. Addressing security concerns will rely on a new era 
of digital forensics and best practices to simultaneously verify and leverage physical and digital evidence 
within a changing regulatory landscape (Salama, 2017). Movement of things from one network to another 
can have implications for forensics because of the challenge of obtaining permission at the perimeters of 
these disparate networks as well as within the networks. 
 
A further challenge is that of available tools for digital forensic investigations. Increasingly investigators 
encounter data that cannot be analysed with today’s tools because of format incompatibility, encryption, 
or the intricacy of the device. IoT forensics requires a multi-faceted approach where evidence may be 
collected from a variety of sources such as sensor devices, communication devices, cloud storage and ISP 
logs. Does the device hold data or is it simply middleware? For example, the Alexa enabled wireless 
smart speaker is a gateway for all voice commands submitted in the home. This intelligent virtual 
assistant interacts with a plethora of compatible IoT devices and third-party applications that leverages 
cloud resources (Chung, Park, & Lee, 2017). Understanding the complex cloud ecosystem that allows 
ubiquitous use of Alexa may be paramount for supporting IoT digital investigations in the future. Using 
innovative technologies, alongside the knowledge acquired from these studies as starting points for 
understanding the IoT world and IoT-ware will help in answering these questions and guiding more 
knowledge on IoT forensics. One of the major challenges to be addressed in the near future, is the 
creation of tools and techniques to analyse the bulk of data and report possible digital clues to the 
examiner for further investigation (Caviglione et al., 2017). While IoT data could be useful in 
investigations, the resulting clash with user privacy may lead to barriers in obtaining data and raise 
concerns about user data and privacy. 
 
While cybercrime investigations and digital forensics have been affected by the identification, collection, 
and analysis of the vast amount of IoT devices available, there is a further challenge in the presentation of 
evidence. Data will often have undergone aggregation and processing using analytic functions that can 
alter the structure and meaning of data. The granularity and semantics of evidence from the IoT will 
create challenges – at the device level, lossy compression techniques may reduce the granularity of the 
data to preserve limited resources such as memory, battery life, network bandwidth. (Hegarty, Lamb, & 
Attwood, 2014). As cloud and related technologies advance, forensic investigators will find it challenging 
to keep pace, in the sense of identifying new forensic artifacts. Thus, there is a need for ongoing research 
into identifying new forensic artefacts in the cloud and related environment (e.g. multi-cloud and 
federated cloud, fog computing, edge computing, and IoT), considering both data-at-rest and data-in-
transit, as well as developing new forensically sound data collection techniques (Choo, Esposito, & 
Castiglione, 2017). To date, the digital investigation processes have been directed by technology being 
investigated and the available tools. Most of these procedures were developed for tackling different 
technology used in the inspected device. As a result, when underlying technology of the target device 
changes, new procedures have to be developed (Selamat, S. R., Yusof, R., & Sahib, 2008). 
 
Without a clear strategy for enabling research efforts that build upon one another, forensic research will 
fall behind the market, tools will become increasingly obsolete, and law enforcement, military and other 
users of digital forensics products cannot rely on the results of forensic analysis (Garfinkel, 2010). 
Existing methodologies are designed for a different generation of evidence sources, and the assumption is 
that the objects of forensic interest will be available and accessible – while in the IoT, objects of forensics 
interest may not always be available or accessible. IoT usage creates a point of interaction between the 
cyber and physical worlds, making digital IoT forensics an effective way to collect information about the 
non-digital environment as well. Once the forensic investigators have located the suspected medium that 
has communicated with respected device, the forensic investigator could proceed with triage examination. 
During this period a very careful investigation is required as fragile data play a huge role in IoT forensic 
investigations. The most common device or platforms that need to cope with are router, gateway, Cloud 
platforms and Fog platforms. The collection of this device or platform also could be known as server 
cluster. The concept of IoT forensic in cloud and fog environment require a new mindset where some data 
will not be available, some data will be suspect, and some data will be court ready and can fit into the 
traditional network forensic mode (Perumal, Md Norwawi, & Raman, 2015).  
 
CONCLUSION  
Due to the tremendous influx of IoT-connected devices, it has become a necessity to develop a new 
process to investigate IoT-related incidents. Challenges for IoT-based forensic investigations include the 
increasing number of objects of forensic interest, relevance of identified and collected devices, blurry 
network boundaries, and edgeless networks. Containing an IoT breach is increasingly challenging – 
evidence is no longer restricted to a PC or mobile device, but can be found in vehicles, RFID cards, and 
smart devices. Addressing security concerns will rely on a new era of digital forensics and best practices 
to simultaneously verify and leverage physical and digital evidence within a changing regulatory 
landscape. While there are no defined principles for IoT forensics, investigations will significantly rely on 
the mechanical and physical nature of the smart device, since identifying evidence sources is a major 
challenge. Currently digital forensic and cyber security investigators are exploring the IoT concerning 
evidence handling, evidence extraction, and analysis of the collected data. Evidence can be collected from 
fixed sensors in homes and buildings, moving sensors built into cars and wearable devices, 
communication devices, cloud storage and even ISP logs. We expect that the practical study of this 
emerging field will identify methods for performing IoT-based digital forensics analysis. The study and 
presentation of considerations for the IoT/IoE area will lay a foundation for the forensic soundness and 
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